Introduction

In the construction of legal documents, such as wills and testaments, precision of language is paramount. However, ambiguous or vague terms are common in wills and testaments, which are frequently written by laypeople or without thorough legal review. In such cases, courts rely on an interpretative tool known as the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a Latin phrase meaning “of the same kind.” Although subject to variation as respects precise phraseology, this doctrine provides that when general words follow an enumeration of certain specific words, those general words are held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind as those specifically listed. It is used to interpret both constitutional statutes as well as testamentary dispositions. 

Section 83 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, expressly recognizes the flexibility required in interpreting wills, allowing both restricted and broader meanings to be attributed to the wordings of the will. However, the exact intention of the testator has to be construed from the words of the will non-negotiably.

This article explores the application of ejusdem generis in statutory provisions and to wills and testaments, particularly under Indian law, and examines how courts have maneuvered this doctrine to uphold the intent of the testator. 

Historical Origins of the Doctrine

In English common law, the principle of ejusdem generis developed to limit general terms that follow a list of particular items to the same class or category. If a document stated, for example, “books, clothes, and other items,” the term “other items” would be construed to mean only items that resemble books and clothing, not real estate or automobiles. Indian jurisprudence eventually adopted this theory, particularly in areas where ambiguities are common, such as statutory interpretation and will construction.

Section 83 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 which governs this doctrine, did not always apply to Hindu wills. The Indian Succession Act was enacted predominantly to consolidate the laws relating to intestate and testamentary succession among non-Hindus — particularly Christians, Parsis, and others governed by law. When it was enacted, Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains were largely governed by their personal laws relating to succession- which means that Hindu wills were governed by customary Hindu law, not entirely by the Indian Succession Act After the Hindu Wills Act of 1870 went into effect, only specific provisions of the Succession Act—such as those pertaining to testamentary succession—were loosely applicable to Hindus.
However, many of the Indian Succession Act’s provisions started to apply to Hindus after India gained independence in 1947, particularly since there was no specific Hindu legal instruction on the subject. Hindu wills executed in accordance with the Indian Succession Act of 1925 are now covered by Section 83.

Core Principle of Ejusdem Generis

Words ordinarily have their normal, primary meanings but in the context of other expressions, they may have to be extended or restricted or modified according to the facts existing when the will was made. According to the ejusdem generis doctrine, generic expressions that follow specific terms in a will are assumed to refer only to things of the same kind as those that are categorically mentioned. As articulated by Jarman in his treatise on wills: 

“When general expressions such as ‘effects’, ‘goods’, or ‘chattels’ stand, immediately associated with less comprehensive words, they have been restricted to articles ejusdem generis, the specified effects being considered as denoting the species of property, which the larger term was intended to comprise.”

General terms in a will must be read subject to earlier specific gifts. The specific gift remains valid in the event of an apparent conflict, and the general gift is restricted to prevent overlap.

This ensures the testator’s intentions are honoured in the most coherent way possible.

This method preserves the idea that the testator’s intent chiefly determines how a will is constructed and executed and guarantees consistency in testamentary interpretation. This rule is not always applied, though. If applying ejusdem generis would blatantly go against the will’s overall intent, courts will refrain from doing so, because this is not a strict legal rule, it is merely an interpretative tool. 

Statutory Framework

Section 83 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 provides a legal foundation for the principle of ejusdem generis in the context of wills. The section reads:

“General words may be understood in a restricted sense where it may be collected from the will that the testator meant to use them in a restricted sense; and words may be understood in a wider sense than that which they usually bear, where it may be collected from the other words of the will that the testator meant to use them in such wider sense.”

This means that general words may be restricted if the testator intended such restriction, and similarly, specific words may be interpreted more broadly if such an intent can be reasonably inferred. This justifiable allowance for both expansion and limitation of meaning reinforces the view that the application of suggestive rules like ejusdem generis should not override the testator’s expressed intentions.

The Act provides three illustrative, explanatory scenarios that clarify the operation(s) of this rule:

(i) If a testator gives A “my farm in the occupation of B,” and to C “all my marsh-lands in L,” and part of the farm overlaps with the marsh-lands in L, the specific gift to A restricts the general gift to C. Thus, A takes the entirety of the farm, including the marsh-lands.

(ii) A sailor bequeaths to his mother “his gold ring, buttons, and chest of clothes” and to a shipmate “his red box, clasp-knife, and all things not before bequeathed.” The shipmate does not inherit the testator’s share in a house because the earlier items belonged to a different genus.

(iii) A testator bequeaths to B all his “household furniture, plate, linen, china, books, pictures and all other goods of whatever kind.” B is entitled only to goods of the same nature as those enumerated, reinforcing the ejusdem generis rule.

This encapsulates the essence of the ejusdem generis doctrine: general terms are constrained by the nature of the specific terms that precede them, to avoid overstretching and to uphold the testator’s probable intent.

English Case Laws following these Illustrations

In Cooke v Oakley, a case that followed illustration (ii), as per the will, some particular articles (like clothing) were given to the mother, the rest not bequeathed before property was given to A. However, the leasehold interest (or testator’s share in the house) was a different piece of property and didn’t go to A, the legatee, because it didn’t fall under the meaning of ‘all things not before bequeathed’- the things bequeathed before were not of the same kind as the leasehold interest, they didn’t have a common genus running through the meanings. 

A similar reasoning was used in Rowlings v. Jennings, which is pertinent to illustration (iii). The testator left his wife “all his household furniture and effects of whatever kind,” along with some stock. According to the court, this excluded irrelevant things like cash or promissory notes.

Timewell v Perkins further cemented this interpretative approach. In this case, where a will included general terms such as “whatever I shall have at my death,” the specific items listed beforehand—plates, linens, horses—guided the interpretation, thereby limiting the scope of the general phrase.

Application in Indian Case Laws

Indian courts have applied the doctrine of ejusdem generis across various contexts, carving out its trajectory judgement by judgement. Before turning to its specific use in interpreting wills, it is helpful to examine how the courts have approached the doctrine more generally.

In the 1954 case of University of Madras v. Shantha Bai, the Madras High Court employed ejusdem generis to decide whether or not the University of Madras qualified as a “State” in consonance with article 12 of the constitution, marking the first constitutional application of this doctrine. Ejusdem generis was used to interpret Article 12’s reference to “other authorities” as referring only to entities carrying out governmental or sovereign duties, such as the legislature and executive.

The court held that the University of Madras did not constitute “other authorities” under article 12 by virtue of not performing similar functions as the other governmental bodies under article 12. 

However, in later cases, the Supreme Court rejected a restrictive ejusdem generis reading of “other authorities,” holding it included all bodies empowered by law, regardless of function, as seen in Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1962).

The Supreme Court in Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, Govt. of Tripura, (1972) and Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (1971) stated that for the application of ejusdem generis, the following conditions must exist: 

1. A statement contains enumeration by specific words.
2. The specific words of the enumeration constitute a class.
3. The enumeration does not enervate a class.
4. The enumeration is followed by a broader term.
5. There is no explicit intention to give the general term a more expansive meaning than this doctrine demands.

The Privy Council decided in Kenneth Descha Joseph v. Esther Phillips that money and passbooks were not considered “personal effects” because they lacked a sentimental or personal component. The court upheld the ejusdem generis principle in this case.

Similar to this, the Privy Council decided in Chunni Lal v. Bai Samrath that formal terms (voces signature) in a will must be interpreted literally unless the context of the will as a whole calls for a different interpretation. This supports the notion that broad terms should not be limited without a valid reason.

The Supreme Court clarified the boundaries of applying the interpretive rule noscitur a sociis (a term that means a word is known by the company it keeps) to ascertain the meaning of an ambiguous word based on its surrounding context in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India (2019). The Court rejected the argument that, given the surrounding clauses, Section 5(8)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted narrowly. It explained that since this clause is meant to be a broad “catch-all,” it cannot be limited by the more specific items listed before or after it.

Moreover, Indian case laws and precedents are flexible when necessary. For example, when a Hindu testator expressed that his widow could adopt a son “from among his brothers’ sons,” but later used a broader phrase “any suitable boy,” the court held that the intent was still to limit the adoption to the family line. This evidences how Indian courts will override broader language when the will’s context points to a narrower intention.

Status Quo

The present judicial stance in India on the application of ejusdem generis in wills is balanced. Courts emphasize that the primary goal is to honour the testator’s intent. In doing so, they often prioritize specific gifts over general ones to avoid contradiction. As seen in Chapman v Chapman, the phrase “cattle, farming implements, etc.” led the court to restrict the general “etc.” to the genus of farm-related items.

Nevertheless, Indian courts also caution against over-restricting words where the testator’s intent was clearly broad. For instance, in Jones v Collins, the testatrix willed all her money left to her siblings unused at their death to go to a good life boat society. Money here, it was held, also meant money on deposit, though it was not immediately available- the enlarged meaning must be considered. It was established that general words do not always have to be cut down by specific ones unless the context clearly demands it.

In the aforementioned Jage Ram v State of Haryana (1971), the Supreme Court laid down a five-fold condition for applying ejusdem generis, underscoring that this doctrine is only presumptive and not obligatory. This doctrinal restraint is crucial in preserving testamentary freedom.

The courts have broad authority to interpret the document in a way that gives the entire document substantial legal meaning and add words to make it more meaningful if the clause is unclear, leads to an absurd conclusion, or has no legal effect. However, this can only occur when it is necessary to use such measures in order to uphold the testator’s intentions.

For instance, if a will left property to a wife, then to the son for life, and then to his male children, and the son passed away without any male children, the estate does not return to the original testator. The term “children” should be read more broadly and not restricted unless very clearly stated.

Opinion and Suggestions

While the doctrine of ejusdem generis remains a valuable interpretive tool, its mechanical application can thwart the actual wishes of a testator. Courts must strike a careful balance. Given that wills often lack technical precision, judicial interpretation should not be overly pedantic. The legislative openness under Section 83 is commendable, offering space for both expansive and narrow readings.

Educating drafters and testators on the risks of vague language can reduce disputes. Clearer judicial guidelines and consistent precedents would also aid interpretation.

Conclusion

Beyond merely providing a rule of language, the application of ejusdem generis in will interpretation represents the judiciary’s growing duty to mediate between testamentary intent and linguistic form. Contextual sensitivity must replace strict interpretive doctrines as wills increasingly reflect a variety of individual circumstances and unconventional expressions. This flexibility is made possible by Section 83, which will remain relevant as long as it gives judges the authority to read between the lines rather than just within them. The main lesson is that legal interpretation must continue to be a human endeavour, grounded in reason but informed by compassion for the testator’s last wishes, especially when it comes to issues as private as wills.