The grant of specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is governed by Section 16(c), which mandates that the plaintiff must plead and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform his contractual obligations from the date of the agreement till the passing of the decree. Explanation (i) to Section 16(c) clarifies that actual tender of the balance consideration prior to filing the suit is not mandatory; however, the plaintiff must establish financial capacity and bona fide intention through credible evidence and consistent conduct. The Supreme Court in Nathulal v. Phool Chand, 1970 held that readiness and willingness cannot be inferred from mere assertions in pleadings or issuance of notices, and must be proved by reliable material showing both the ability and intention to perform. This position was reiterated in J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, 2011 where the Court held that vague claims or speculative arrangements are insufficient, and failure to prove readiness under Section 16(c) is fatal to a claim for specific performance, irrespective of the defendant’s conduct.

Specific performance is further an equitable and discretionary remedy under Sections 10, 16, and 20 of the Act (as applicable prior to the 2018 amendment), and is not granted as a matter of right. Courts are required to consider the conduct of both parties and the overall equities of the case. In K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan 1997, the Supreme Court held that delay, lack of diligence, or absence of bona fide intention disentitles a party from equitable relief. Where both parties have failed to perform their contractual duties, courts may refuse enforcement to avoid inequitable outcomes. In such circumstances, forfeiture of earnest money is governed by Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which permits only reasonable compensation. Thus, Forfeiture is impermissible where it results in unjust enrichment, particularly when the party seeking forfeiture is itself in breach.